Google’s Email Services Are Not a Public Function: Delhi HC
The Delhi High Court dismissed a petition against Google, ruling that providing email services is a commercial activity, not a public function.

The Delhi High Court has delivered a significant ruling regarding the legal status of major tech giants, stating that a private company's provision of email services does not automatically make it subject to writ jurisdiction. Even if a user's business depends heavily on these services, the court clarified that the nature of the service remains commercial rather than a public duty.
Justice Amit Mahajan delivered the verdict while dismissing a petition filed by a media organization, Janta Live Press Network Pvt Ltd, which was seeking the restoration of its Gmail account access.
The Core Legal Dispute
The case arose when Janta Live Press Network, which operates the YouTube news channel Janta Live News, alleged that its Gmail account was accessed by unauthorized third parties on July 20, 2026. Following this "unusual activity," Google disabled the account.
The petitioners claimed they attempted to resolve the issue through various channels:
- The company's director contacted Google Support via a personal email.
- A formal complaint was lodged with the Cyber Police Station.
- The company eventually approached the High Court, arguing that Google performs a "public function" and should therefore be accountable under writ jurisdiction.
The petitioners relied on the Information Technology Act, 2000, and the Information Technology Rules, 2021, to argue that Google's massive reach necessitates such legal oversight.
Size Does Not Equal Public Duty
In a decisive observation, Justice Mahajan noted that the scale or popularity of a company is not the benchmark for determining whether it performs a public function. The court emphasized that the decisive factor is the nature of the function performed.
"The decisive consideration thus is the nature of the function and not merely the size or reach of the entity concerned," the court observed.
The court explained that for a private body to be subject to a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, it must perform functions similar to those of the State, such as:
- Functions performed in a sovereign capacity.
- Services specifically outsourced by the State.
- Activities closely connected to the State's obligations regarding public welfare.
The court held that providing email, hosting, or other digital services falls under commercial activity and does not automatically fall into these categories.
Distinguishing Precedents
The petitioners attempted to cite a previous Delhi High Court judgment, XYZ v. Union of India, to support their claim. However, the court distinguished the two cases, noting a fundamental difference in the relief sought.
In the XYZ case, the issue concerned informational privacy and the de-indexing of judicial records from search results to protect reputations. In contrast, the current petition sought the mere restoration of access to a private email account. The court noted that while statutory obligations exist for grievance redressal and intermediary compliance, these do not transform a commercial dispute into a matter of public law.
Furthermore, the court rejected the argument that the importance of the account to the petitioners' media operations changed the legal nature of Google's business. The judge pointed out that email services are provided by various independent providers and are not a monopoly held by Google.